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such doubts are not sufficiently strong to outweigh the
moral costs of judging wrongly against animals. For a
stronger case, genuinely positive evidence from
neurophysiology, rather than a priori theorizing from
evolutionary biology, will be required.
Harrison attacks the combined analogical argument
on the basis of skepticism about the relationships
between neurophysiology, behavior, and mental states.
Since studies indicate that the relationships between
neural structures and mental states are not nearly as
straightforward as once believed, one cannot,
according to Harrison, appeal to similarities in human
and animal neural structure and function to support
the conclusion that humans and animals have similar
mental pain states. 1
A major weakness of this kind of skeptical response
is that it can also be directed against the claim that our
fellow humans feel pain. Harrison's problem then is to
justify the ascription of mental pain states to humans
but not to animals. 2 Harrison might try to base a case
for this on the disanalogies between human and animal
neurophysiology, particularly those involving neo
cortical structures that might be associated with pain.
However, Harrison does not do this, at least in part
because his skepticism about such relationships itself
seems to disallow it. It would be ironic for speciesists
if such skepticism ended up dismissing some of the best
evidence we might have for human superiority.

Peter Harrison, in two articles, "Theodicy and
Animal Pain," and "Do Animals Feel Pain?," argues
for the position that animals do not feel pain. In doing
so, Harrison attacks two major types of justification for
the existence of mental pain states in animals:
1. the combined analogical argument from
common pain-behavior and its associated
neurophysiology, and
2. the evolutionary argument from the adaptive
usefulness of mental pain states in enabling
animals to respond appropriately to injury.
I will frrst indicate-briefly-the major problems with
Harrison's frrst line of criticism, and why his second
line of argument is important for his position. I will
focus the major portion of my attention on a criticism
of Harrison's second line of attack, in which he turns
the evolutionary argument around, arguing that mental
pain states could not have evolved in animals. I will
argue that his position is based on dubious appeals to
parsimony, on an excessively "adaptationist" view of
evolutionary theory, and on questionable claims about
what mental capacities of animals are necessary to make
pain a feature of animal life. While Harrison's
arguments raise doubts about whether animals feel pain,
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Another problem is that some ofHarrison's skeptical
evidence can be used just as readily against his position
as in support of it. Harrison cites, for example, the case
of "thin-brained" human individuals, whose skulls are
mostly fluid-filled space, with a thin layer of brain tissue
pressed against the skull. Many of these individuals,
far from being "vegetables," seem to have normal
cognitive abilities, and are of apparently nonnal, or
above normal, intelligence.3 He also notes the ability
of birds to "see" in spite of the fact that they have no
region of their brain corresponding to our visual cortex.
In fact, the neurophysiological architecture associated
with their vision is quite different from ours.4 However,
such cases could just as well support the possibility that
animals with tiny brains, or with very different brains
from ours, feel pain.5 If we combine this possibility
with the moral argument for giving animals the benefit
of the doubt, we might need to give this benefit to
roaches and flatworms as well as to apes and rabbits.
This moral benefit of doubt enters here because the
skeptical argument is, in the end, neutral concerning
the existence of mental pain states in animals. Animals
might feel pain or they might not. A morally isolated
epistemology might lead us to prefer non-mentalist
parsimony here. As moral agents, however, we must
consider the costs ofbeing wrong: if we are to be wrong,
it is better to err on the side of kindness than on that of
cruelty. Although this position cannot be accepted
without qualification, I will pass over such qualification,
both because of limited space and because Harrison in
fact recognizes its force, using it as part of the reason
for pursuing his other line of argument. 6
In an effort to justify denying pain to animals but
not to humans, and to provide a positive argument
against the existence of animal pain that is sufficiently
strong to counteract the moral benefit ofdoubt, Harrison
resorts to evolutionary theory. According to Harrison,
evolution would not favor the development of mental
pain states except in a being capable of determining its
action on the basis of reasons rather than instincts or
reflexes. Furthermore, only a being capable of making
free choices can act on the basis of reasons. Since
humans, but not animals, base their actions on reasons
since humans, but not animals, make free choices-it
is only in humans that the evolution ofmental pain states
constitutes a reasonable evolutionary development or
adaptation. For Harrison, mental pain states serve a
necessary function only as a "voice of the body in the
deliberations of the mind, and only in a being that can
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overrule the body's demands in favor of consciously
chosen objectives.?
Harrison's case can be attacked in two ways: First,
one can aigue that animals do in fact act on the basis
of reasons, and that they do make free choices.
Alternatively, one can argue against the need for a
connection between reason-based choice and pain. I will
pursue the latter path here, since that focuses on
Harrison's misuses of the notion of parsimony and the
theory of evolution.
Hairison depends on appeals to several kinds of
parsimony in his argument. One kind he draws upon is
that of C. Lloyd Morgan, who held that we should not
explain behavior in terms of"higher psychical faculties"
when explanations in terms of "lower psychical
faculties" suffice. 8 It seems clear from what Harrison
has said that he considers pain to be a "higher" faculty,
rather than the primitive "raw feel'' that some of us
might think it is, an assessment that has found support
from studies showing that there is a large cognitive
component to human pain perception.9
Harrison also appears at times to endorse the position
that we should not explain animal behavior in terms of
mental states wben purely physical--or behavioristic
explanations would suffice. 10 This certainly seems true
of his attitude toward animal pain behavior, which
Harrison feels can be adequately explained by reflexes
and noumentalistic behavioral principles. It could also
be applied, and has been applied by many workers, to
support a general denial of conscious states in animals. 11
It is not clear to me why Harrison does not go all the
way with this, and deny the existence of consciousness
in animals, notjust mental pain states. In fact, in one of
his articles, he proposes, although with minimal
justification, a temporally-fragmented consciousness
for animals. 12 This generosity may be important
given the existence of animal consciousness, the
evolutionary usefulness of pain is very defensible, as
we will see shortly.
The two kinds of parsimony mentioned so far can
be invoked independently of evolutionary theory. An
application of two additional parsimony principles (to
be mentioned shortly) will yield Harrison's evolutionary
position: Since pain is not a necessary feature of
animals' consciousness, either for their actual adaptation
to their life needs (i.e. for their survival and repro
duction), or for our explaining their behavior, then it is
not reasonable to suppose that they feel pain. Notice
that this kind of argument call be raised against any
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It may be helpful, and even parsimonious, to
assume some limited degree of conscious
awareness in animals, rather than postulating
cumbersome chains of interacting reflexes and
internal states of motivation. 14

feature of animal consciousness, not just animal pain.
This can be seen upon application of the following
"evolutionary parsimony" principles:
1. If a feature is not required in order to explain the
adaptive behavior of an organism, then one should
not infer the existence of that feature; and

Although the assumption that animals feel pain may
not be strictly necessary to explain their behavior, it
does not follow from this that pain could not be an
evolutionary adaptation. The appropriate question in
adaptive evolutionary terms is: Is pain the best available
option, or was it the best available one during the period
in which it arose? Is (or was) it. for example, more
efficient in "neurological economy" to have a
mechanism to create a feeling of pain, or instead to have
a set of reflexes ready-made or developed for every
occasion? It might have been (and might still be)
advantageous for pain to be the cause of an action, not
merely an extra. and therefore unnecessary, cause. If
one grants the adaptive efficiency of consciousness as
the arena for at least some animal decisions-whether
the decisions are automatic or not-then pain can serve
within this arena as the "voice of the body." Pain, in
this account, would not require that animals make "free''
choices. I say this in spite of the fact that one may
challenge Harrison's assumption that animals do not
choose freely, as well as his assumption that humans
do choose freely.
Pain may not be the most efficient way to make an
animal behave appropriately. However, evolution does
not always produce the absolutely best or most efficient
adaptation, but only the best or most efficient one given
the material available (i.e. heritable physical features
and genetic variance of such features). Evolution does
not mold creatures freely, but instead operates within
the limits of the genetic endowment and the constraints
of developmental systems inherited from evolutionary
forbears. For example, we breathe in and out, with an
inefficient tidal respiration system that wastes most of
the oxygen we take in and that voids carbon dioxide
rather poorly. It is certainly less efficient than the "flow
through" respiratory system of birds. However, we had
to settle for what we received-and were stuck with
from the therapsid reptile forbears. Birds, who have
apparently descended from a different lineage-that of
the dinosaurs-were not so constrained.
Similarly, pain might be "the best we higher animals
could get." A reflex-generation system might be the
most efficient mechanism of adaptation for a robot,

2. If a feature is not required for an organism•s survival
and reproduction, then it will not arise through
evolution, or at least will not become established
in that organism's evolutionary lineage.
Note that the second principle is not an episte
mological parsimony claim; it is a claim about how
evolution in fact works, and the fmt principle may be
considered its epistemological derivative. This
evolutionary parsimony represents an "adaptationist"
approach to evolutionary theory, which has come under
serious challenge in the past decade and a halfP The
specific type of adaptationism on which Harrison's
position depends is, I believe, an excessively strong
one-a claim that organisms in evolutionary lineages
will eventually fmd the most effective ways to adapt
themselves to particular circumstances, as if organisms
were infinitely malleable adaptation machines. Before
criticizing Harrison's position on this basis, I will point
out two ways in which consideration of parsimony can
support the claim that animals do feel pain.
A straightforward way in which parsimony can be
invoked to support a case for animal pain is as follows:
Since animals have the same structures that produce
pain in humans, an account of animals in which they
do not feel pain must invoke additional principles to
account for this difference. It would be more
parsimonious to use an account in which such extra
principles are not required; namely, one in which similar
causes produce similar effects and in which animals,
like humans, feel pain. In this case the burden of proof
would be on pain opponents to find relevant
disanalogies between human and animal cases.
One can also use consideration of parsimony to
support a case for conscious states in general, as Donald
Griffin has attempted to do. He has argued. with limited
success, that some patterns ofbehavior, and the intricacies
of processing demanded by some behavioral tasks, are
so complex that consciousness could actually be a more
efficientmechanism for these than made-for-the-occasion
neurological circuitry. According to Griffin:
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which we can design from the start or by modifying
another robot. It may not have been the most efficient
way, however, for a lineage of our vertebrate ancestors
that had inherited their neuroanatomy from primitive
placoderm fish or lancelet-like chordate ancestors.
It may help at this point to distinguish two versions
of the second evolutionary parsimony principle, based
primarily on different substitutions for the expression,
'not required~' In one case, 'not required' is identified
with 'useless'; in the other case, it is identified with
'not the best possible way' (in which case a feature is
not required because a better alternative is available).
This gives us the following:

the neurophysiology associated with conscious pain
states, and perhaps that associated with states of
consciousness in general. Until we do so, we cannot
tell whether consciousness is more efficient than "hard
wired" adaptations, because we do not yet now exactly
what it is we are comparing. To evaluate the
evolutionary claims we would need further information
on the evolution of neural structure and its genetic basis.
I am aware, of course, that I may be grossly
understating the enormity and complexity of such
tasks. Ne·,;ertheless, support for Harrison's position
seems to require tackling them, since evolution works
not on isolated mental states, but on the physical ones
that produce or modify them, and only ones that are
under genetic controL
Given our ignorance in such matters, and given
the inability of a priori evolutionary theorizing and
appeals to parsimony to settle the question of animal
pain, the moral benefit of doubt in favor of animals
should prevail. This does not mean that we must
assume that animals such as flatworms, jellyfish and
barnacles feel pain, or that they feel it as fully as we
do. But it means that we must be willing to accept the
uncertainty that is involved in dealing with a complex
combination of neurophysiological, behavioral, and
evolutionary evidence, and that we be willing to fall
into occasional anthropomorphic error. And one may
even change one's mind, as has Peter Singer, who once
drew the line "somewhere between a shrimp and an
oyster" but has since removed bivalve mollusks from
his diet, although this is in part because "it is so easy
to avoid eating them."17
It also means that those who wish to deny the
existence or the magnitude of pain in animals, either
specifically or in general, have the burden-as well as
the opportunity-of identifying disanalogies between
human states and animal states that would support such
claims. It is quite possible that the conclusions of such
studies will be highly unfriendly to those who wish to
protect animals. However, such studies will have to be
empirical-and often more messy and inconclusive than
anyone would like-rather than a prioristic. We must
look to the animals, not just to the theories of those
such as Darwin and Lloyd Morgan.

2a) If a feature is useless for promoting an organism's
survival and reproduction, then it will not become
established in that organism's evolutionary lineage.
2b) If a feature is not the best possible way of
promoting an organism's survival and reproduction,
then it will either not become established in that
organism's evolutionary lineage, or will be replaced
by a better alternative.
Principle 2b is the one that has been under attack
here. However, principle 2a is comparatively reasonable
(in spite of the fact that it is not true without some
qualification 15), and when people assent to the second
evolutionary parsimony principle as originally stated,
they are likely to have something like 2a in mind.
Harrison would have a much stronger case if pain were
actually useless as an adaptation, as it would be in plants,
for example, since they cannot take action to remove
themselves from the dangers that would be signaled by
pain. Because pain would in fact have no benefit in
such a case we would not expect it to be preserved in
evolution. 16 I will note here that one of the reasons why
Harrison can turn the tables on the adaptive-evolutionary
argument for animal pain is that such an argument
actually presents a much stronger negative case against
pain in plants, and in sessile animals such as sponges,
than it does a positive case for pain in animals.
Pain is certainly not useless for animals, and it is
conceivable that it either is the best way to promote
appropriate danger-avoidance behavior or was the best
available such way during a crucial period in early
vertebrate evolution. However, is it true that it either is
or was the best available such option? We don't know.
In order to know we need to know much more about
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